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Foreign Assistance at Home:
Increasing USAID Accountability
Through Victim Participation
Rights in the
Foreign Assistance Act
Shefali Saxena*
The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) has been the chief arm of U.S. foreign assistance,
dedicated to sustainable development in developing countries.
However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, support for USAID
waned, resulting in a loss of autonomy, structural integrity, and
overall effectiveness. A troubling consequence of these internal
problems has been the misappropriation of USAID funds, where
local governments in developing countries have abused these
contributions by using them for personal gain at the expense of
their citizens’ human rights. With reduced capacity and
inadequate monitoring mechanisms, USAID has been unable to
address these pressing human rights violations. Current victims
do not have any means of domestic recourse, and this Note
submits that it is USAID’s duty to provide some form of
redress. This Note proposes that Congress should amend the
Foreign Assistance Act to include a private right of action for
victims and their representatives to challenge USAID’s actions.
Such an amendment would be consistent with other U.S. agency
practice, and more importantly, would comport with the U.S.’
and international community’s commitment to addressing
human rights abuses.

*

B.A. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; J.D., Case Western Reserve
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I. Introduction
The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) has faced several institutional and organizational problems
since its inception in 1961,1 but recently Human Rights Watch has
highlighted an additional, growing concern.2 USAID funding for
projects in developing countries such as Ethiopia3 and Vietnam4 has
1.

See F. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson & Andrew Natsios, Arrested
Development, Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool, 87 FOREIGN
AFF. 123, 124 (2008).

2.

See Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Deadly
Aid, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2012/08/06/deadly_aid?page=full.

3.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT FREEDOM; HOW AID
UNDERWRITES REPRESSION IN ETHIOPIA 40–41 (2010), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/10/19/development-without-freedom
[hereinafter ETHIOPIA REPORT].

4.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REHAB ARCHIPELAGO; FORCED LABOR AND
OTHER ABUSES IN DRUG DETENTION CENTERS IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM 26,
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been used to fuel egregious human rights abuses, either directly
through projects implemented by USAID, or indirectly through
politicization of USAID funds by local governments. While several
proposals have been made to implement sweeping changes to USAID’s
structure, including more effective monitoring of USAID project
funding, the suggested remedies do not truly address the underlying
problems, have not been put into effect, and in any case, will likely
take several years to enact.5 Further, the few reforms that have been
implemented—while helpful—do not ultimately target the
fundamental issues that have led to human rights violations.6
The most alarming aspect of this problem is that there are
currently no avenues of redress or accountability for victims of
USAID funding.7 There are no statutory schemes in the U.S. that can
provide any form of recognition, let alone remedy, for these victims.8
Compounding this issue, USAID is not only unaware of the conditions
in these countries after funding has been delivered, but it also has
inadequate means of rectifying this deficiency. Many proposed
solutions center around a complete overhaul of USAID, which would
take a significant amount of time and resources, while doing nothing
to help current victims. The incremental internal changes now
occurring within USAID similarly leave victims without a true
remedy. Therefore, a more immediate solution is needed to address
these victims’ rights, while the underlying structural changes can be
set in motion over the next several years.
This Note proposes an alternative solution that involves a limited
amendment to USAID’s mandate in the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA),9 rather than a time-intensive reimagining of the entire statute.
30–40
(2011),
available
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/09/07/rehab-archipelago
VIETNAM REPORT].

at
[hereinafter

5.

See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 128 (suggesting that USAID be
structurally separated from the State Department); John Waggoner,
Congress Debates US Aid Reforms, FRONTLINES (USAID, Washington,
D.C.), Sept. 2009, at 1, 14 (outlining a proposed bill to reform USAID
internally through evaluation centers and increased training).

6.

See McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2 (noting
the Obama Administration’s initial steps to reforming USAID, including
efforts to lengthen funding cycles and alter funding patterns).

7.

See id. (“Today, no specific mechanisms exist to prevent harm to
indigenous people or forcible displacement of local groups in conjunction
with economic, agricultural, mining, or infrastructure programs.”).

8.

None of the discussions on proposed changes to USAID include how to
address the immediate impact on victims of USAID funding. See, e.g.,
Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 127; Waggoner, supra note 5, at 1, 14.

9.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1961)).

629

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2014
Foreign Assistance at Home: Increasing USAID Accountability

Specifically, it argues that creating a private right of action within the
FAA itself is the most effective means of giving victims a voice and
an opportunity for redress until USAID can undergo the necessary
structural changes that will prevent such abuses in the future. Such a
right of action already exists in several U.S. administrative agencies,
and Congress should extend that practice to USAID, especially given
the nature of the human rights abuses. Further, the idea of victim
and public participation in litigation has a long history in both
American and international jurisprudence. Additionally, the creation
of a private right of action will serve another function for USAID: it
will have a monitoring effect so that USAID can become aware of the
types of violations that are taking place. By allowing groups and
NGOs that have the access and capability of reaching the areas where
these violations are occurring to present a case, USAID would be
made aware of issues and problems that they otherwise were
incapable of realizing. Most importantly, such an amendment to the
FAA would provide the only legal recourse for foreign victims of
USAID funding, as no other statute or mechanism exists to achieve
this purpose—in particular, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) would not apply.
While the future of U.S. foreign assistance ultimately depends on
comprehensive changes in USAID’s structure and organization, a
limited amendment to the FAA would be more expedient in
addressing the immediate problem of human rights violations.
However, because it is essentially USAID’s institutional weaknesses
that lead to the human rights abuses, a thorough assessment of these
long-term problems and solutions through institutional reform is
necessary to determine why such an amendment is comparably more
efficient and effective. Further, the broader changes must also be
considered to ultimately improve USAID’s effectiveness and prevent
further and future human rights abuses.
This Note analyzes the perennial problems afflicting USAID, the
resultant human rights abuses, and possible solutions to address these
issues. Part II provides the historical background and overview of
USAID’s institutional problems, as well as an examination of the
human rights abuses in Ethiopia and Vietnam. Part III reviews the
practice of public and victim participation in U.S. administrative
agencies, including issues of standing to challenge administrative
agency actions. Part IV looks to the rationale of the Victim
Participation Clause in the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court as guidance for creating similar rights in the FAA.
Part V discusses the Alien Tort Statute and its limitations. Part VI
briefly notes the limited scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Part
VII provides an analysis of how public participation doctrine can be
applied in the context of USAID and proposes the components of a
statutory amendment to the FAA as well as potential long-term
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solutions to be considered in addition to the amendment. Part VIII
concludes and summarizes the analysis.

II. USAID’S Background, Problems, and Resulting
Human Rights Violations
A.

Historical Problems with USAID and the Issue of Aid Effectiveness

USAID is the primary administrative agency that oversees the
delivery and implementation of development assistance programs
overseas.10 Congress mandated USAID through the FAA in 1961, and
it has remained the principal development arm of the U.S.11 While the
U.S. has the highest disbursement levels of any other donor country,12
with USAID supporting $17.8 billion in projects in 2013,13 USAID
faces a two-tier problem. The first tier relates to the underlying
institutional issues that involve USAID’s organization and structure.
These fundamental problems lead to the second, more immediate tier
of human rights violations that result from the misuse of USAID
funding.
The FAA was enacted “[t]o promote the foreign policy, security,
and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the
world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and
external security, and for other purposes.”14 These goals translate into
U.S. foreign assistance program initiatives designed to “support U.S.
national security and promote economic growth, poverty reduction,
and humanitarian relief abroad.”15 During the Cold War, USAID
enjoyed autonomy and considerable resources, and was on the whole
effective in achieving its stated goals.16 Specifically, USAID

10.

USAID History, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaidhistory (last updated May 15, 2014).

11.

See id.; Foreign Assistance Act § 102.

12.

Aid to Poor Countries Slips Further As Governments Tighten
Budgets,
OECD
(Mar.
4,
2013),
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernm
entstightenbudgets.htm (stating that the U.S. remains the largest donor,
contributing a total of $30.5 billion in 2012).

13.

U.S. Agency for International Development, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE,
http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/Agency_USAID.aspx?FY=2014
&tabID=tab_sct_Peace_Disbs&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014).

14.

Foreign Assistance Act, 75 Stat. at 424.

15.

Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 124.

16.

See id. at 125; see also Kevin Baron, Gates: “Congress is part of the
problem” in State, USAID Shortfalls, STRIPES CENTRAL BLOG (Aug. 23,
2010),
http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central1.8040/gates-congress-is-part-of-the-problem-in-state-usaid-shortfalls-
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complemented the foreign influence of the State Department and
Pentagon—USAID agents could more effectively address development
issues because they had a greater integrated field presence in the
target areas.17 They were able to establish contacts and interactions in
more remote cities with civil-society leaders, government officials,
local legislative agencies, businessmen, and ministries, ensuring both
the effectiveness and sustainability of development programs.18
Following the Cold War, however, USAID underwent
organizational changes that resulted in a loss of independence and the
assumption of a subordinate role.19 Because USAID was instituted in
response to the Cold War, in the period after, several members of
Congress no longer believed in its purpose.20 USAID functions and
budget were now under the aegis of the U.S. State Department, which
made USAID’s agenda secondary to the State Department’s.21 Upon
losing its independent authority, USAID “lost staff, programmatic
flexibility, and influence with Congress, other government
departments, other aid donors, and recipient nations.”22 Because
USAID became less effective as a result, multiple splinter agencies
with similar development goals were established, none of which were
consolidated or overseen by the USAID Administrator. These various
groups work on competing or overlapping projects, and with little
interaction or communication between them and USAID, foreign
assistance projects have suffered from a lack of efficiency and
representation; donors and recipients are unclear as to which entity is
1.115680 (according to former U.S. Defense Secretary, Robert Gates,
“[USAID] had been a huge player in our success in the Cold War”).
17.

See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 125.

18.

See id.

19.

See id. at 125–26; see also CLINTON-GORE ADMINISTRATION HISTORY
PROJECT:
USAID’S
ROLE
1993-2001,
at
1–2
(2000),
available at http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research%
20-%20Digital%20Library/ClintonAdminHistoryProject/81-90/Box%208
7/1756250-united-states-agency-international-development-usaid-historyduring-clinton-administration.pdf.pdf (describing that after the Cold
War, USAID fell prey to declining resources, changing relationships, and
structural problems).

20.

See Roger Bate, The Trouble with USAID, 1 AMERICAN INTEREST 113,
114 (2006) (recalling that a vocal opponent of USAID was Senator Jesse
Helms who wanted USAID eliminated, opining that foreign aid was like
“throwing money down foreign rat holes”).

21.

See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 128; see also Bate, supra note 20, at
114 (stating that post-Cold War, USAID became accountable to the
State Department).

22.

Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 125; see also Baron, supra note 16
(citing former Defense Secretary Robert Gates as saying that there were
16,000 USAID employees in 1993 and only 3,000 in 2006).
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representing U.S. aid efforts.23 This “organizational chaos” has led to
increased costs of implementation, which in turn delay
implementation and reduce impact.24 In 2006, USAID was fully
integrated under the State Department, forcing the USAID
Administrator to oversee both the foreign assistance of the State
Department, as well as USAID, despite the fact that these two
agencies have different agendas and goals. The centralization of
USAID’s function hindered its ability to reach recipient countries and
tailor development programs to their specific needs—the very ability
that made USAID effective during the Cold War.25
Further, the importance of development aid in the U.S. has been
downplayed, which has led to significant budget, staffing, and staff
training cuts.26 Because maintaining a field presence in developing
countries is integral to the effective implementation of USAID
projects, staffing cuts that result in a reduced field presence are
particularly harmful to USAID’s effectiveness.27 Specifically, such a
limited connection to the developing countries naturally minimizes
USAID’s oversight and monitoring capabilities to the effect that
human rights abuses occur without USAID’s knowledge or
accountability. On a deeper level, the resultant loss of trained
manpower has effectively changed the foundation of USAID,
transforming it “from a creative, proactive, and technically skilled
organization focused on implementation to a contracting and grantmaking agency.”28 This growing bureaucratization has propelled

23.

See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 125–26.

24.

Id. at 126; see also Lack of Leadership at USAID Limits Effectiveness of
U.S. Foreign Assistance, INTERACTION, (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.
interaction.org/article/lack-leadership-usaid-limits-effectiveness-usforeign-assistance (last updated Nov. 10, 2009) (“[T]his deficit in
leadership has led to a rising trend in transferring development issues to
other U.S. government agencies”).

25.

See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 126.

26.

Id.; Bate, supra note 20, at 114 (2006); ANDREW NATSIOS, CTR. FOR
GLOBAL DEV., THE CLASH OF THE COUNTER-BUREAUCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT
26–27
(2010),
available
at
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424271 (describing how
the massive staffing cuts slowed down development projects in the field,
and left technical experts “little time” to monitor and implement
current programs).

27.

Cf. Bate, supra note 20, at 117–18. USAID employs the advice of
several U.S. consultants in administering their programs, particularly in
the area of global health policy. Commentators have found that
“Western consultants are often ineffective because they lack detailed
knowledge of local conditions,” and many do not visit the program’s
site. Id.

28.

Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 127.
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USAID down a spiral of ineffective policies and reduced flexibility and
leverage.29
Policymakers have suggested several structural changes that could
mitigate many of these problems, though all these recommendations
stem from an overhaul of the FAA to restore USAID’s autonomy and
independence. USAID’s mandate has not been substantively amended
since 1985.30 In 2009, former Senator John Kerry, as Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, attempted to refashion the FAA
to specifically address the organizational, monitoring, and oversight
problems that USAID was facing. The draft of the new bill
incorporated several long-term solutions including a decentralized
structure where USAID would reclaim independent or cabinet-level
status, and an evaluation mechanism where USAID could assess a
program’s social benefits and weaknesses prior to implementation.31
However, due to budgetary constraints and the low-level priority that
is placed on development issues,32 this reform attempt was killed in
committee.33 Because these reforms were never passed or executed,
USAID continues to experience the same problems of ineffectiveness
that ultimately have led to human rights abuses.
B.

Human Rights Abuses Resulting from Misappropriated USAID
Funds

Human Rights Watch (HRW), a nonprofit NGO focusing on
reporting human rights violations around the world,34 recently
published two reports based on investigations in Ethiopia and
Vietnam exposing various human rights abuses. While the reports
found that the national governments in the respective countries are
29.

See id.; NATSIOS, supra note 26, at 26–27.

30.

Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 130; Waggoner, supra note 5, at 14.

31.

See Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009,
S. 1524, 111th Cong. §§ 5, 6 (aiming to amend sections of the original
Foreign Assistance Act to involve greater monitoring efforts and
impact assessments) (2010); ADS Help Document: Brief on “Social
Soundness
Analysis,”
USAID
1,
http://www.usaidgems.org/Documents/ADS200HelpDoc_SocialSoundne
ssAnalysis.doc (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); CONNIE VEILLETTE, CTR. FOR
GLOBAL DEV., THE FUTURE OF U.S. AID REFORM: RHETORIC, REALITY,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A REPORT OF THE RETHINKING U.S. FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 27 (2009).

32.

See John Norris, Five Myths About Foreign Aid, WASH. POST
(Apr.
28,
2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0428/opinions/35231618_1_foreign-aid-foreign-assistance-act-aid-programs
(stating that “[f]oreign aid has few domestic allies”).

33.

VEILLETTE, supra note 31, at 27.

34.

Human Rights Watch, Who We Are, http://www.hrw.org/node/75136
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
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responsible for these abuses, HRW also discovered that USAID
funding has been used to directly cause or facilitate these human
rights violations.35
1.

Ethiopia

As of 2009, USAID was supplying $530.9 million to Ethiopia
through the World Bank project entitled the Productive Safety Net
Programme (PSNP). Executed in 2005, PSNP was designed to assist
Ethiopia with its food shortage by supplying transfers of food or cash
to households with no food security through public works, or through
direct transfers to those who are unable to work.36
According to fifty local residents in Ethiopia where PSNP funds
were delivered, the ruling party was using the PSNP money as
leverage to gain and maintain political control. Several members of
opposition political parties were excluded from the program.37 USAID
funds that were intended for crucial food needs are held hostage by
the Ethiopian government unless intended recipients pledge loyalty
and support to the ruling party and cease any opposition movements
or beliefs.38 Some locals who attempted to report this abuse to
independent investigators or to foreign journalists were detained, and
in some cases, the journalists themselves were detained and
threatened with deportation.39
Moreover, victims suffering from these abuses are disenfranchised
and lack domestic avenues of recourse in their home countries. While
PSNP provides for a local Appeals Committee and council that are
intended to deal with complaints related to the PSNP program, locals
attest that these bodies are controlled by the ruling party and often
systematically deny or refuse to entertain claims challenging the
government’s actions and behavior.40 Beyond the corruption concerns,
the appeals structure also suffers from a lack of clarity and efficiency;
35.

McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2.

36.

ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 31; see also USAID, Productive
Safety Net Program (PSNP), http://ethiopia.usaid.gov/programs/feedfuture-initiative/projects/productive-safety-net-program-psnp
(last
updated Jan. 3, 2013).

37.

ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 40–41.

38.

Id. at 72; McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2; see
also Jeffrey Gettleman, Repression is Alleged Before Vote in
TIMES
(May
20,
2010),
Ethiopia,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/world/africa/21ethiopia.html?pag
ewanted=all&_r=0.

39.

ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 43.

40.

See, e.g., ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 77; Beverly Jones, Leading
Civil Society up the Governance Path: Civil Society as ‘Instrument of
Democratic Structural Adjustment’ –A Case Study from Ethiopia (Nov.
15, 2008).
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an Overseas Development Institute report found that 79 percent of
local Ethiopian people did not utilize the Appeals Committee either
because they believed there was no one to complain to, or if they did
know of the existence of the Committee, they were not aware of the
appropriate person to contact.41
HRW identifies two primary problems that lead to these abuses.
First, due to the repressive nature of the government and remote
locations of the areas where the USAID funding is being sent,
information and communication are severely hindered, and detection
of politicization is difficult. Second, USAID lacks adequate monitoring
and evaluation safeguards. A Development Assistance Group report
stated that a USAID fact-finding mission in 2009 found no evidence of
discrimination in this program, despite widespread testimony that it
was occurring.42 Even other neutral international organizations such
as the Overseas Development Institute and the International Food
Policy Research Institute reported that PSNP funds were used as a
political tool of repression as early as 2006.43 While some did not find
that the problem was pervasive throughout the system, they still
encouraged the crucial necessity of long-term transparency efforts to
increase effectiveness and detect, correct, and prevent abuses.44 A
donor official of PSNP stated that the politicization of funds was “not
a criterion for monitoring” and that he doubted the “rapid response
teams would pick it up.”45 HRW proposes solutions to improve
monitoring capability, essentially reiterating the need for independent
monitoring without the involvement of the Ethiopian government,
with the express purpose of detecting politicization risk. It also
recommends corrective measures beyond heightened monitoring,
which include ways to condition receipt of funding on compliance with
human rights standards and other measures.46
2.

Vietnam

Similarly in Vietnam, HRW discovered that USAID funding has
been misused to directly lead to human rights violations. The
program at issue is the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR), through which nearly $102 million was expected to
41.

OVERSEAS DEV. INST., TARGETING ETHIOPIA’S PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET
PROGRAMME (PNSP) 26, 57 (2006), available at www.odi.org.uk/
resources/docs/3966.pdf; ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 77.

42.

ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 44.

43.

See OVERSEAS DEV. INST., supra note 41, at 50; ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra
note 3, at 44–45.

44.

ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 44–45.

45.

Id. at 76.

46.

Id. at 9, 78.
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be delivered to Vietnam in 2011.47 One of USAID’s aims in this
program was to provide training assistance to staff at twenty drug
detention centers, including how to conduct HIV and TB screening
and care, drug addiction and relapse prevention services, and
addiction counseling.48 Despite these efforts, the centers have been the
site of involuntary or arbitrary detention, with no due process or
method for appeal, forced labor, poor working conditions, and
physical abuse as punishment.49
HRW noticed similar problems between Vietnam and the
Ethiopia cases; namely, USAID’s deficient monitoring and evaluation
capacities. While PEPFAR expressly states that programs should be
implemented consistent with human rights obligations, and that U.S.
law prohibits the use of aid funding to violate workers’ rights,
USAID’s monitoring and evaluating indicators do not include any
human rights indicators—rather, they encompass only those relating
to staff training procedures.50 Further, USAID never responded to
HRW’s requests to obtain more information about the human rights
conditions of the drug detention centers.51 HRW proposes that stricter
monitoring and evaluation is necessary to specifically account for
human rights abuses and their causes.52 In addition, as in Ethiopia,
detainees in Vietnam were not informed of any process through which
they could challenge or appeal detention center decisions, despite the
fact that Vietnam does have an administrative appeals ordinance.53
C.

Limitations in the FAA

The various sections of the FAA reveal in greater depth USAID’s
purpose, its engagement in several projects, and how it intends to
achieve its goals. The statute is replete with provisions expressing
Congress’ commitment to providing assistance to achieve sustainable
development in developing countries. In furtherance of this objective,
it enumerates five major principles that USAID intends to uphold,
including “the encouragement of development processes in which

47.

VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 75; The U.S. President’s Emergency
Plan for Aids Relief, Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Vietnam,
USA.GOV, http://www.pepfar.gov/countries/vietnam/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 30, 2014).

48.

VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 76.

49.

Id. at 26, 30–40.

50.

Id. at 84.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 25, 31 & n.84.
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individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced”54
and “the promotion of good governance through combating corruption
and improving transparency and accountability.”55 Further, it
specifies several “mandatory” principles (i.e., indicated through the
use of “shall”) that various actors must follow, including the USAID
Administrator and the President, when implementing any projects.
There are many requirements on monitoring,56 reporting,57 supporting
anti-corruption efforts,58 and supporting human rights,59 indicating a
pervasive intent to make USAID transparent and accountable, and to
comply with international obligations on human rights. However,
while these are compulsory, the act does not prescribe any particular
method for fulfilling these responsibilities; they read more like
hortatory guidelines rather than stipulations. USAID’s current
structural problems and the existence of human rights abuses confirm
the ineffectiveness of these provisions—the situations in Ethiopia and
Vietnam are cases where civil and economic rights are disrespected,
and where both countries’ governments have exhibited corruptive
behavior—all in direct contravention of USAID’s purpose. Moreover,
the FAA contains no provisions allowing a party to challenge or
review any projects.
An examination of the two-tier problem exposes the conflict in
determining an adequate solution to USAID’s problem. The first-level
of institutional problems reveal that USAID is in need of complete
restructuring and reform, chiefly in the form of a new mandate in the

54.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 101(3), 75 Stat.
424 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1961)) (citing from the “General
Policy” section).

55.

Id. § 101(5) (citing from the “General Policy” section).

56.

See, e.g., id. § 104A(d)(4) & (d)(7) (requiring monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms for projects combatting HIV/AIDs); § 128(b)
(stating that monitoring is necessary to ensure that the intended poor
recipients receive loan assistance); § 131 (calling for the USAID
Administrator to manage a monitoring system in the Microdevelopment
Grant Assistance project).

57.

See, e.g., id. § 489 (requiring the President to report to Congress on
whether the stated goals have been met in the International Narcotics
Control project); § 498 (demanding a similar reporting requirement in
its Assistance for Independent States of Soviet Union project).

58.

See, e.g., id. § 129(b)(3) (emphasizing anti-corruption in Foreign Banks
projects); § 133 (encouraging “good governance” programs); § 490(b)(2)
(obligating the U.S. to consider whether a country has taken measures
to prevent corruption prior to engaging in bilateral or multilateral
cooperation).

59.

See, e.g., id. § 502B (reiterating the U.S.’ obligations under the U.N.
Charter and its general commitment to promoting and respecting
human rights).
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FAA. However, given the failed attempt to rewrite the FAA in 2009,
coupled with declining expertise and staff, it is unlikely that this
attempt will be resuscitated soon. The second-level of problems in the
form of human rights abuses suggests that USAID needs more staff
and enhanced monitoring and enforcement capability—changes that
would require a new FAA mandate. Due to this conflict, an
alternative solution needs to be offered, one that would not
necessarily involve a broad overhaul of the FAA, which would likely
take several years. A limited amendment to the FAA, allowing for a
recognition of victims’ rights and a possible course of legal action in
U.S. federal courts would specifically address the issue of human
rights without reaching the extensive structural reforms. Because
victims have no domestic avenue of legal recourse,60 coupled with the
fact that USAID has grown detached from its intended beneficiaries
(and now victims) overseas, Congress must create a connection to
these victims through the U.S. court system.

III. Private Rights of Action, Standing, and Public
Participation Doctrine in Administrative Agencies
In order to provide USAID victims or their representatives access
to U.S. courts, their injury must be a legal harm cognizable in the
courts, and then the victims must themselves have actually,
personally suffered this harm. The latter requirement, which is tested
under standing doctrine, would be particularly difficult to meet in a
case involving USAID victims—absent a private right of action—for
several reasons: there are numerous potential parties that represent
majority rather than minority interests; they are citizens of foreign
countries; and resolution of their problems may implicate prudential
concerns such as generalized grievances and political question
doctrine. The following section explores the mechanics of a private
right of action, and how its existence can facilitate or overcome
barriers to standing. Additionally, it examines standing doctrine and
its expansion in the context of challenges to administrative agencies,
showing that the concept of public participation in these cases has
been upheld both to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights, and to aid or improve
agency function. Ultimately, this body of case law serves as a legal
basis that supports the idea of USAID victim participation through
the creation of a private right of action in the FAA.
A.

Statutory Rights and Standing Doctrine

In order to successfully bring a claim in a U.S. court, parties must
have both a cause of action, or a “legal harm” that carries entitlement
60.

See ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 77; VIETNAM REPORT, supra note
4, at 25, 31 & n.84.
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to relief, as well as standing under the U.S. Constitution, which
requires “actual harm.”61 Specifically, parties attempting to challenge
federal agency action can do so in one of three ways. The first, which
will be discussed further in Part C of this section, is parties can raise
a claim using Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act,62
which provides a general cause of action to challenge agency decisions
where the plaintiff is aggrieved or adversely affected within the
meaning of the relevant statute, and where the statute itself is silent
on the availability of judicial review.63 The second is when a
particular regulatory scheme contains a specific provision allowing
judicial review.64 Third, if the governing statute of the agency
contains a private right of action, then the statute defines a cause of
action, and the parties may act through that vehicle.65 By creating a
private right of action to enforce statutory provisions, Congress also
effectively creates, or recognizes, a statutory right for which a legal
remedy is available if the right is violated.66 An express private right
of action contains the following components: the persons able to bring
suit; those who are potentially liable; forum for the suit; and the
potential remedy available.67

61.

See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s
Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 178 (2012) (“To win a
federal lawsuit, a plaintiff needs both legal harm (cause of action) and
an injury-in-fact . . .); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and
Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 280–81 (2008). The U.S.
Supreme Court also reiterated this point in Tennessee Electric Power
Company v. Tennessee Valley Authority when it held that while the
alleged injury, competition, would occur, it was not the basis of a cause
of action because the damage was “not consequent upon the violation of
any right recognized by law.” 306 U.S. 118, 135–35, 137. (1939).

62.

Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
501 et seq.)

63.

Regional Mgmt. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir.
1999); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882–83 (1990).

64.

Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d at 467 (Murnaghan, C.J., concurring);
Hoefler v. Babbitt, 139 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1998).

65.

Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d at 461; Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882.

66.

This proposition has received particular affirmation in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, though these cases have not involved federal agencies.
See, e.g., Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014),
petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 1171 (U.S. May 1, 2014) (No. 131339) (“Congress’s creation of a private cause of action to enforce a
statutory provision implies that Congress intended the enforceable
provision to create a statutory right.”); Fulfillment Servs., Inc. v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2008).

67.

Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. CV 09-08950, 2010 WL 1444878, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010), aff’d 722 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Even if Congress were to create this right, parties would still have
to cross the justiciability barrier by meeting the constitutional
requirements for standing—they would have to show that they indeed
suffered a particularized, redressable injury resulting from a violation
of this protected right. Standing is a “threshold determination that a
particular plaintiff is entitled to engage the judicial machinery to
adjudicate the merits of a dispute involving an otherwise justiciable
issue.”68 It consists of two essential components that a plaintiff must
overcome to present a case. The first originates from Article III of the
Constitution, requiring that the claim is a “case” or “controversy,”
meaning that the plaintiff must allege at a minimum (1) an injury-infact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s alleged wrongful
conduct, and (3) that lends itself to some form of redress.69 The injury
must be actual, “concrete,” and particularized in that the injury
represents a “minority” interest, not one that appeals generally to the
public.70 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted standing when
the plaintiff was “among the injured,” even if many people were
affected by the alleged harm.71 While this ruling may seem at odds
with the Article III requirement, standing was maintained because the
injury was still sufficiently personal.
While determining the legal harm for the cause of action and the
actual harm for standing purposes may seem like the same inquiry,
they are in fact distinct. Standing is necessary, but not sufficient, for
a cause of action;72 there can only be standing if a plaintiff alleges a
violation of a legally protected right.73 Thus, merely having a legal
68.

Kevin A. Coyle, Comment, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge
Administrative Agency Actions, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1067–68 (1988).

69.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992); see also Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); Hessick, supra note 61, at 276; Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1981).

70.

Ex Parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974).

71.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563; see Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 208–12 (1972) (recognizing that an individual has a personal
interest in living in a racially integrated community, and the denial of
that interest is a legally cognizable injury that can serve as the basis for
standing).

72.

Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and
Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2001).

73.

Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75
HARV. L. REV. 255, 256 (“[T]he quest for a legal right on which to
ground standing is a tautology, since the grant of standing itself
manifests a legal right.”); see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 4 COMMENTARIES
*23 (“[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”).
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right that has been violated does not necessarily imply that a party
has suffered an actual injury for standing purposes, nor does suffering
an actual injury indicate a legal harm has been violated or that there
is a cause of action. Courts have reaffirmed that legal harms can be
congressionally created through private rights of action, holding that
Congress can “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law”74
and “create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of
which can confer standing to use even where the plaintiff would have
suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute.”75
Courts have curbed this power by ensuring that Congress cannot
confer standing by statute; it can only recognize—or “elevate”—de
facto legal harms that can form the basis for a subsequent standing
determination.76 Thus, parties alleging violation of statutory rights
would still need to meet the Article III requirements by proving they
suffered an actual injury beyond the violation of the statutory right.
However, in some instances where the alleged actual injury
derived from a statutorily created private right of action, courts have
essentially found that the violation of the right itself sufficed as the
requisite injury-in-fact for standing. The U.S. Supreme Court has not
outright stated that the violation of the statutory right constituted
the actual injury; the Court found injury-in-fact based on the
consequences of the right being violated. For example, in FEC v.
Akins,77 the Court granted standing to a group of voters who claimed
they were “aggrieved” by a Federal Election Commission decision that
determined a certain committee was not subject to political
committee reporting requirements under the Federal Election
Campaign Act.78 The Court held that standing was appropriate
because the Act created a right to information, a right otherwise
unavailable without the statute, which was violated when the FEC
allowed the committee to avoid reporting.79 While it appears that the
74.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. An example of such an instance when Congress
“elevated” a de facto injury occurred in Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., where the court granted standing to two white residents of an
apartment complex to challenge the owner’s discrimination against
black residents because the Civil Rights Act of 1968 created a right to
be free from the harmful consequences of discrimination. 409 U.S. 205,
210–11 (1972).

75.

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975).

76.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (stating that increasing the types of injuries that
can confer standing does not mean that the Article III injury
requirement can be bypassed); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 2.3 (4th ed. 2003).

77.

524 U.S. 11 (1998).

78.

Id. at 14–15.

79.

Id.
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Court was suggesting the violation of the right to information was the
injury-in-fact, its analysis focused instead on the consequence of the
violation—the deprivation of information—and found that to be the
actual injury.80
Nonetheless, this subtle difference demonstrates that the line
between a violation of the statutory right and the actual injury is not
always clear. Indeed, as one legal scholar concludes, where private
rights of action are involved, the injury-in-fact analysis is
“superfluous;” the violation of the right itself is an injury sufficient for
standing.81 Several recent cases in the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts
of Appeals uphold this view.82 One of the Ninth Circuit cases, Robins
v. Spokeo, Inc., for which a certiorari petition is currently pending,
confirmed that the “violation of a statutory right is usually a
sufficient injury in fact to confer standing.”83 This conclusion almost
suggests that Congress can confer standing when creating private
rights of action; however, the Ninth Circuit did recognize limitations
on Congress’ power to do so. First, it acknowledged that the other
Article III requirements, causation and redressability, still apply so
that the traditional standing analysis has not been entirely
displaced.84 Second, it reiterated the analysis from a Sixth Circuit
case, holding that a plaintiff must still be “among the injured” where

80.

Id.

81.

Hessick, supra note 61, at 303–04. Hessick notes, however, that in an
effort not to abrogate the injury-in-fact requirement, the Supreme Court
has always found some way to insert the traditional analysis, or find
some alternative justification, in cases where it would otherwise seem
that the violation of a statutory right sufficed for the actual injury.
Similarly, others have argued that none of the standing requirements
should apply where procedural rights are created via statute. Procedural
rights are those that provide an entitlement to have a government
agency perform certain process-based or procedural duties, such as
preparing an environmental impact statement. See Lee & Ellis, supra
note 61, at 174 & n.21, 175, 191. Justice Scalia stated this view in a
footnote from the majority opinion of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
essentially finding that Congress can alter some of the Article III
standing requirements where procedural rights cases are involved. See
Lee & Ellis, supra note 61, at 191.

82.

See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for
cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 1171 (U.S. May 1, 2014) (No. 13-1339);
Fulfillment Servs., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 614 (9th
Cir. 2008); Beaudry v. Telecheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702 (6th Cir.
2009); In re Carter, 553 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. 2009).

83.

See Spokeo, 742 F.3d at 412.

84.

Id. at 414 (asserting that while the two other elements of Article III
standing still apply, the analysis “boil[s] down to ‘essentially’ the injuryin-fact prong”).
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his statutory rights were violated, and that the injury must be
“individual, rather than collective, harm.”85
The significance of this trend in cases involving private rights of
action is that while standing remains a separate concept, courts
nonetheless seem to grant standing more readily where a violation of
private rights is involved. Naturally, the language of a cause of action
is crucial in determining which parties may actually bring suit, and
moreover, “the scope of the cause of action determines the scope of
the implied statutory right”86—meaning the wording of the cause of
action defines the nature and extent of the injury for which standing
can be conferred. In spite of these variables, a private right of action
carries several advantages; namely the recognition of new legal rights,
of which the mere violation may allow entry to a court.
In challenges to agency action, there are three formulations or
inquiries through which a court can determine whether the
particularized injury requirement of Article III has been satisfied. The
plaintiff must claim he personally suffered a “legal wrong” as a direct
result of agency action, and that the law was specifically designed to
prevent that harm;87 or he falls within the definition of “adversely
affected” or “aggrieved party” under the various governing statutes
that created the administrative agencies;88 or with respect to the APA
cause of action, his interest falls within the “zone of interests” that
the substantive statute seeks to protect.89 The second means forms the
basis for statutory review cases: if the statute created a duty that the
agency must perform for the benefit of someone like the plaintiff, and
the agency disregards this duty without a sufficient reason, then the

85.

Id. at 413 (citing Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 707); see also Scalia, supra note
69, at 886, 895 (opining that courts “should not be inclined to assume
congressional designation of a ‘minority group’ so broad that it
embraces virtually the entire population”).

86.

Spokeo, 742 F.3d at 413.

87.

Scalia, supra note 69, at 895.

88.

Id. at 895; Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action:
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 428
(1974) (explaining that an action brought pursuant to a statute is
considered “statutory review” and allows “any party in interest” or “a
person aggrieved or adversely affected” to seek review).

89.

Scalia, supra note 69, at 895; Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (stating that in addition to Article
III requirements, the question of standing is “whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question”).
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plaintiff is entitled to relief.90 These types of cases tend to be more
effective when challenging agency action.91
The second component of standing consists of “prudential
limitations” to standing that the court imposes on itself to foreclose
consideration of a claim that otherwise satisfies the Article III
standing requirements.92 These include the general prohibition on the
ability of a litigant to raise another person’s legal rights (i.e., thirdparty standing), the rule “barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches” (i.e., separation of powers and political question doctrine),
and “the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint falls within the zone
of interests protected by the law invoked.”93 As discussed infra pages
656–59, a private right of action often preempts any prudential
concerns a court may have.
B.

Public Interest Representation in U.S. Administrative Agencies

The following cases show the development of the doctrine of
standing in the context of federal regulatory agencies (i.e., those
regulating commerce, energy, and communication). They expose not
just the doctrinal requirements of standing, but also the courts’
growing interest in public interest litigation that can ultimately be
analogized for agencies such as USAID—cases where the public
interest was successfully litigated reveal which components are
necessary to create a form of recourse for victims of USAID funding.94
Giving citizens of foreign countries and their representatives
access to the U.S. judicial system to challenge USAID action may
seem outside the province of the courts. In actuality, however, the
90.

See Albert, supra note 88, at 429–30 (describing three cases involving
the Interstate Commerce Commission that demonstrate this approach;
namely Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 267 (1924), wherein
standing was granted because the legal injury was one specifically
contemplated by statutory mandate).

91.

Cf. Hessick, supra note 61, at 293 (“Although statutes placed duties on
administrative agencies, those statutes did not create rights in
individuals. Under the legal-interest standard, individuals factually
harmed by agency action had no recourse in the courts, and the
judiciary was largely unable to address unlawful agency conduct.”).

92.

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Scalia, supra note 69,
at 885. Prudential limitations are discussed infra pp. 656–59.

93.

Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 12 (2004).

94.

In terms of the Article III standing requirements, the focus of this
discussion will be on the “injury-in-fact” element—whether plaintiffs
have a private legal right that if violated by an agency, would create
such an injury. For more information on these other requirements, see
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §
13 (6th ed. 2002).
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idea of extending participation rights in agency decisions and judicial
review to a wider set of parties and interests dates back to the midtwentieth century. During that time, courts sought to increase
oversight and accountability of agencies, and thus began to take a
more expansive view of both participation rights and standing.95
Before then participation in agency adjudication was extremely
restricted—generally only private parties whose liberty or property
interests were affected by agency action were allowed to participate.96
With respect to participation rights, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a
rapid growth of advocacy groups in areas of civil rights, health and
safety, and the environment, among others.97 The courts found that
these groups should be entitled to participation rights in agency
decision-making, thus contributing to the formation of public policy.98
Giving a voice to these groups actually served the public interest
more effectively than the original closed-door protocols of agency
action.99 The prior model of allowing only private parties whose
liberty or property interests were affected by agency action to
participate was too restrictive, and did not allow agencies to function
in the public’s best interest as they had intended.100 Thus, the
involvement of public parties has the practical effect of facilitating
certain agency functions; it is the mechanism that creates a liaison
between the agency and the public that the agency is designed to
serve.
Early cases began developing this expansive doctrine not just by
gradually including more types of parties and injuries, but also by
95.

See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 305 (11th ed. 2011) (“This restrictive view
of the ‘relevant’ private voices was changed as part of a legal, social and
political transformation during the 1960s and 1970s. . . . Government
was called upon to take an affirmative role in ensuring social justice and
enhancing physical and economic well-being.”).

96.

See id.

97.

See id.

98.

See id. at 306 (stating that there was a “new emphasis on empowering
otherwise underrepresented voices to participate meaningfully in the
crafting of public policy”).

99.

See id. (observing that as the government began to expand their
regulatory agendas, “questions were being raised about the ability of the
administrative process, as traditionally structured, to in fact discern the
‘public interest’”).

100. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1759–62 (1975) (“The expansion of the
traditional model to afford participation rights in the process of agency
decision and judicial review to a wide variety of affected interests must
ultimately rest on the premise that such procedural changes will be an
effective and workable means of assuring improved agency decisions.”).
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interpreting the statutory language at issue as encompassing both
economic and non-economic injuries as a basis for complaint.101 A
seminal Second Circuit case marking the transition from economic
injuries to non-economic injuries and the recognition of the public’s
rights, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission,102 held that nonprofit conservation associations had
standing for a claim to prevent implementation of the Federal Power
Commission’s (FPC) storage hydroelectric project in the Hudson
River area, in order to protect the aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational purposes of this area. Petitioners raised their claim under
Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, which is the judicial review
portion of the substantive statute creating the FPC.103
In deciding that these non-economic interests were protected legal
rights, the Court looked to both the language and purpose of this
statute, asserting that it is the court’s duty “to see to it that the
[FPC]’s decisions receive that careful consideration which the statute
contemplates.”104 Two key sections informed the Court’s decision to
recognize the plaintiffs’ injuries. The first was the judicial review
section under which the claim was brought, which states that “[a]ny
party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued
by the [FPC] may obtain a review of such order in the United States
Court of Appeals. . . .”105 To determine the meaning of “aggrieved”
within the context of the statute, the Court referenced Section 10(a)
of the Federal Power Act,106 which states the conditions that the FPC
must follow when instigating a project—including, inter alia, that it
be “best adapted . . . for other beneficial public uses . . . and
recreational and other purposes.”107 Thus, part of the FPC’s
obligations is to consider “recreational and other purposes” of its
projects, and if it neglects this duty, then a party may be “aggrieved”
by this inaction, thereby entitling him to judicial review. In finding
that the interplay of these two sections essentially created a statutory
legal right protecting recreational rights, the Court kept in line with
previous decisions involving similar claims under the Federal Power
101. See Note, The Law of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of
Intervention, 1967 WASH. U. L. Q. 416, 423–24 (1967) (stating that
generally, only economic interests and electrical interference cases
involving the FCC were recognized to accord standing in challenging
administrative agencies); Hessick, supra note 61, at 289.
102. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 825/(b).
104. 354 F.2d at 612.
105. 16 U.S.C. § 825/(b) (emphasis added); 354 F.2d at 615.
106. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1).
107. Id.
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Act.108 Moreover, the Court emphasized the importance of the express
statutory language in that it “may create new interests or rights and
thus give standing to one who would otherwise be barred by the lack
of a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”109
The Second Circuit also contemplated and ultimately rejected the
FPC’s concern that such an expansion of standing might overburden
the agency and hinder its operative efficacy by encouraging “literally
thousands” to intervene and seek review in future proceedings.110 In
addition to the fact that litigation is self-limiting through its
prohibitive expenses and demands on time, the Federal Power Act
nonetheless “creates no absolute right of intervention” because it
allows the FPC to retain authority in limiting the parties eligible to
intervene or seek review.111 The expansion of standing can thus
protect both the public interest while still preserving the
administrative efficiency of a federal agency.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
followed the public interest approach in Scenic Hudson and
acknowledged the importance of “audience participation” in Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal

108. See, e.g., Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 216 F.2d 509,
511–12 (7th Cir. 1954) (recognizing that the public has rights in
recreational, historic, and scenic resources under the Federal Power Act,
and that recreation is a special right which is part of the “public
interest” that must be considered); Washington Dep’t of Game v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 n.11 (9th Cir. 1953) (holding a
nonprofit organization of students had standing to challenge an FPC
dam project that would destroy fish because the “Federal Power Act
seeks to protect non-economic as well as economic interests”).
109. 354 F.2d at 615–16; see also Washington Dep’t of Game, 207 F.2d at
398 n.11 (holding that petitioners are denied standing unless they fit
into the “aggrieved” category as stated in the Federal Power Act);
Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 632 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that the
plaintiff had standing because he was “adversely affected” within the
meaning of the statute so that he could challenge orders of the Federal
Security Administrator). Moreover, the Court found that the FPC
construed “aggrieved party” too narrowly; it observed that standing law
is “complicated” and is “more or less determined by the specific
circumstances of individual situations” (citing United States ex rel.
Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953)).
110. 354 F.2d at 617; see also Note, supra note 101, at 425–26.
111. 354 F.2d at 617; 16 U.S.C. § 825(g)(a) (“In any proceeding before it, the
[FPC], in accordance with such rules and regulations as it may
prescribe, may admit as a party any interested State, State
commission . . . or any other person whose participation in the
proceeding may be in the public interest.” (emphasis added)); see Alston
Coal Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 137 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1943).
(reiterating that intervention under this section is “permissive and rests
in the sound discretion of the Commission”).
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Communications Commission.112 While this case adopted a similar
line of reasoning to earlier non-economic injury cases, it espoused a
new doctrine that the right of intervention, which was already vested
in competitors and major consumers, was now also vested in
“representative groups of the general public.”113 Thus, this case
continued the trend of expanding standing to additional parties,
deeming them as interested parties also considered within the
meaning of a statute. The Appellants in this case—the United Church
of Christ and individual residents of Mississippi—filed a petition with
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prevent the FCC
from renewing the license of a local radio station, WLBT.114
Appellants claimed that WLBT failed to serve the public interest
because it deliberately provided an unbalanced presentation of key
issues involving race and religion. They alleged that by increasing the
number of commercials and entertainment programming to prevent
an opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on topics of
social relevance, WLBT intentionally performed a public disservice.115
Moreover, the imbalance in programming reflected a broader practice
of discrimination and disrespect by minimizing exposure for AfricanAmericans.116
Appellants asserted standing before the FCC117 on three bases:
that they were individuals and organizations (1) that were denied a
reasonable opportunity to share their viewpoints in violation of an
FCC policy called the Fairness Doctrine, (2) that represented almost
one half of WLBT’s potential audience, who were equally denied
rights under the Fairness Doctrine and who were generally
discriminated against in WLBT’s programs, and (3) that represented
the total audience, regardless of race or religion, who were denied fair
and balanced programming as required by the Fairness Doctrine.118
The FCC implemented the Fairness Doctrine in a 1949 report,119
placing a premium on the “right of the public to be informed, rather
than any right on the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee
or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own
112. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
113. Note, supra note 101, at 424–25.
114. 359 F.2d at 998.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Note that “standing” in this context means “administrative standing,”
or standing to bring a claim before an administrative agency, not Article
III standing before a court.
118. 359 F.2d at 999.
119. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40009, FAIRNESS
DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 2 (2011).
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particular views on any matter.”120 Essentially, the Fairness Doctrine
embodied a public interest standard that licensees must meet.121
In contesting Appellants’ standing, the FCC argued that
Appellants must show “a potential, direct, and substantial injury or
adverse effect” resulting from the administrative action under
consideration in order to have standing.122 Because the general
listening public does not suffer a particular injury, they cannot have
standing; furthermore, granting the public standing would impose
heavy administrative burdens. The FCC maintained that the only
two recognized grounds for standing were economic injury and
electrical interference.123 The Court, however, refuted this argument,
addressing the grounds for standing first. It stated that precedent did
not dictate that these are the only two justifications for standing;
moreover, where there is a statutory goal of public-interest
broadcasting, courts have granted standing when parties are not
acting to protect their own private interests, but rather are acting to
vindicate public interest.124
Specifically, in an earlier case, NBC v. FCC,125 the D.C. Circuit
Court held that nonprofit radio stations had standing with the FCC,
even though—as nonprofit agencies—they could not show economic
injury. The Court reasoned that the statutory goal of public interest
broadcasting necessarily recognized nonprofit stations as interested
parties, and that a requirement of economic injury would necessarily
deny them that interest. Thus the court recognized an alternative
injury (electrical interference) as a basis for standing in addition to
economic injury. It was ultimately the public interest objective that
governed standing, not any particular or enumerated injury.126
To further justify its reasoning, the D.C. Circuit appealed to three
policy rationales. First, the entire purpose of standing is to provide a
120. 359 F.2d at 999 n.5.
121. Due to political opposition and constitutional issues, the Fairness
Doctrine was eliminated in 1987 and officially removed in August 2011.
See RUANE, supra note 119, at 2; Brooks Boliek, FCC Finally Kills Off
(Aug.
22,
2011
3:22
PM),
Fairness
Doctrine,
POLITICO
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/08/fcc-finally-kills-off-fairnessdoctrine-061851.
122. 359 F.2d at 1000.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1001.
125. 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff’d 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
126. See Note, supra note 101, at 417 (emphasizing that in FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, the economic injury the radio station would likely
suffer was “not itself a relevant issue before the Commission. It was
relevant only in that it afforded Sanders standing for the purpose of
litigating the public interest.”).
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functional means through which only those parties with a “genuine
and legitimate interest” could participate in a proceeding.127 In this
case, the listening audience (and its representatives) had a clear stake
in the actions of a broadcast licensee, which by its very nature is
intended to serve and respond to the audience’s needs. The Supreme
Court had previously applied this broader standard of “interest” for
standing in multiple other cases involving parties challenging
administrative agency actions.128
Second, allowing the public to intervene in agency affairs has an
additional benefit of facilitating agency functions. While the FCC is
the ultimate authority in ensuring that broadcast licensees are serving
public interests, it has an enormous number of duties, a wide
jurisdiction, and insufficient staffing; it is unfeasible for the FCC to
monitor all licensees within its purview.129 Given these constraints,
public participation can mitigate these deficiencies. Public
involvement is a type of monitoring mechanism, for “public response
is the most reliable test of ideas and performance in broadcasting as
in most areas of life . . . The Commission view is that we have
traditionally depended on this public reaction rather than on some
form of governmental supervision or ‘censorship’ mechanisms.”130
Incorporating the public into the agency process thus helps the
agency perform its statutory obligations. More importantly, the Court
recognized that if the agency did not allow public participation, then
it is likely the programming bias and discrimination would never have
come to the FCC’s attention.131
The federal courts also played a similar role in public interest
litigation: “by providing a public right of intervention to complement
the use of the standing cases to direct the discretion of the FCC [they]
have further indicated their desire that the Commission utilize its
broad discretion to serve the public interest.”132 Moreover, standing
can be used as a “vehicle by which courts indicate to regulatory
agencies what issues the courts consider relevant to a determination of

127. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1002; see also Citizens Comm. for Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying the same
standard).
128. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1001; see also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470 at 475 (stating that an important element of
public interest is to render “best practicable service to the community”);
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (same).
129. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1003–05.
130. Id. at 1003.
131. Id. at 1004.
132. Note, supra note 101, at 433.
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public interest.”133 Granting standing is indicative of what is in the
public interest—while the legislature grants administrative agencies
enough power to develop their own standards, when the FCC “fail[s]
to provide meaningful standards, federal courts turn to standing
doctrine as a means of instructing the FCC as to what issues are
relevant to its consideration.”134
Third, administrative agencies should capitalize on the public’s
proactive interest in intervening in their decisions—by allowing the
public to monitor and enforce the quality of broadcasting, agencies
assume a more advantageous position: governmental power shifts into
the “more detached role of arbiter rather than accuser.”135 Thus, in
addition to honoring statutory obligations of serving the public
interest, granting standing has more far-reaching effects in the
performance of agency functions.
With respect to the FCC’s second argument, that allowing public
standing would create an unmanageable administrative burden, the
Court echoed reasoning from Scenic Hudson stating that this
potential problem can be corrected by “developing appropriate
regulations by statutory rulemaking” and by implementing formal
standards to discern which public parties and petitions state
legitimate interests.136 The power to make these rules and standards
should be conferred on the FCC, so that it is in a position to control
the extent of its burden.137 The Court also noted that it is unlikely the
less stringent standing requirements will overwhelm the FCC because
the process of challenging agency action is inherently self-restricting.
The costs of these proceedings are excessive enough to exclude many
parties who would otherwise wish to participate.138
Public participation thus has an important role in administrative
agency proceedings: it is sometimes necessary for the agency to
achieve it statutory purpose of serving the public interest, and it also
assists the agency in performing other crucial functions.
133. Id. at 430 (asserting that this use of standing doctrine was demonstrated
in United Church).
134. Id. at 430–31.
135. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1003.
136. Id. at 1005. Even though there are solutions to the administrative
burdens, nonetheless the need to vindicate public interest is paramount.
As Edmond Cahn astutely asserted, “[s]ome consumers need bread;
others need Shakespeare; others need their rightful place in the national
society—what they all need is processors of law who will consider the
people’s needs more significant than administrative convenience.”
Edmond Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
13 (1963).
137. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1005.
138. Id. at 1006.
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C.

Cases Under the Administrative Procedure Act

Other cases falling under the category of public interest litigation
include those claims raised under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),139 which provides a cause of action for certain challenges to
agency decisions. This statute provides, in pertinent part: “[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. . . .”140 While it is widely
accepted that the APA contains a strong presumption in favor of
judicial review,141 it is important to note that not all agency actions
fall within the scope of the APA.142 The APA’s use of “legal wrong”
implies a wrong that is already “cognizable in the courts,” where
standing could already exist according to “traditional principles.”143
Further, by incorporating the terms “adversely affected” or
“aggrieved” “within the meaning of a relevant statute,” the APA is
referring to specific statutes that recognize the rights of such parties
to sue; thus, a claim under the APA must either be pursuant to some
statute that uses those or substantially similar words,144 or it must be
within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statute at
issue.145
Two major cases brought under the APA, Sierra Club v.
Morton,146 where the plaintiffs were not granted standing, and United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP),147 where the petitioners were accorded standing,
demonstrate the limitations in the APA’s applicability. The Supreme
Court in Sierra Club clarified that a built-in caveat within the
139. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
501 et seq.).
140. Id. § 702 (emphasis added).
141. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); Bowen v. Mich.
Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
142. Scalia, supra note 69, at 887, 889; see also Note, Statutory Preclusion of
Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 431, 433–35 (1976) (discussing the limiting effects of the APA).
143. Scalia, supra note 69, at 887.
144. Id. at 887–89.
145. See Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395–96 (explaining
that even where a statute makes no specific reference to “aggrieved”
persons, one may still bring a claim under APA Section 702 as long as
the interest sought to be protected is within the broader zone of
interests of the statute).
146. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
147. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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language of the APA is that the plaintiff himself must be among the
injured that have suffered from an agency action. The plaintiff Sierra
Club was a membership corporation with a special interest in
conservation and preservation of national parks, game refuges, and
forests in the U.S.148 It aimed to challenge the construction of a ski
resort and recreation area in a national game refuge and forest,
alleging that the project would negatively impact the area’s natural
beauty and ecology.149
However, Sierra Club did not claim that the proposed ski resort
would affect the club or its members, or even that the club used the
area at all; rather, it was raising the complaint as a “public action”
asserting it had a “special interest” in the general preservation of the
area, regardless of whether it was personally affected.150 The Court
held that despite broad readings of the APA’s requirements in the
past,151 an immutable criterion to standing under the APA is that the
party seeking review must be among the injured, even though the
Court acknowledged that environmental interests are sufficient types
of injuries.152 Because Sierra Club did not assert personalized injury
according to a “relevant” statute as the APA requires, it was beyond
the scope of the APA. The Court further distinguished true “public
action” cases as those in which Congress created an express statutory
protection for the public’s interest, where plaintiffs could then obtain
judicial review under the APA as “responsible representatives” of the
public—even though they did not suffer injuries themselves, they
suffered as representatives, which satisfied the personalized injury
requirement for standing.153 Ultimately, for an APA action, a plaintiff

148. 405 U.S. at 730.
149. Id. at 735.
150. Id. at 736.
151. See, e.g., Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 154, 156 (1970) (holding that to fall within the scope of the APA,
the alleged injury could fall “within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated” by the statutes the agencies allegedly violated); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (same); Scalia, supra note 69, at 889
(describing the holding in Data Processing as expanding the APA’s
requirement of being “within the meaning of the relevant statute” to
“adversely affected or aggrieved in a respect which the statute sought to
prevent”).
152. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734–35.
153. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1970). The Second Circuit held first that claims under the APA
were appropriate where the specific statutes made reference to
“aggrieved parties,” but had either no judicial review process at all or no
adequate process. Id. at 102. Further, because two statutes granted
public interest rights in environmental resources, plaintiffs had standing
as “aggrieved parties” within the meaning of the statute even though
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must allege harm pursuant to some statute that would include him
among “aggrieved” parties, or at least consider his claim as within the
zone of interests of the statute.
In contrast, the Court in SCRAP granted various environmental
groups standing under the APA for a claim alleging that the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had unlawfully imposed a
surcharge on freight rates without considering the environmental
impact such a tariff would cause on the entire D.C. area.154 While it
may seem that this claim’s standing is equally as tenuous as the one
in Sierra Club, there are two distinguishing aspects between these
cases. First, the Interstate Commerce Act contains language stating
that upon receiving a complaint, or by its own volition, the ICC may
conduct a hearing on the lawfulness of such rates.155 Thus, for the
purposes of APA standing, the plaintiffs used this provision as a basis
for their environmental claims, asserting they were “aggrieved” by the
surcharge.156 Second, the Sierra Club plaintiffs could not claim that
they would be directly harmed by the agency action; however, the
groups in SCRAP alleged that the widespread environmental impact
of the surcharge in the region would necessarily affect them.157
Moreover, the allegedly adverse effects of federal action in Sierra Club
would be limited in geographic scope to that particular refuge and to
those who specifically used it. Here, on the other hand, there was
potential for pervasive environmental injury by affecting the natural
resources for the entire area.158 Thus, in order for a plaintiff to
successfully use the APA as a vehicle for his claim, he must still allege
a personalized injury and be “aggrieved” (or within the zone of
interests) per a specific statute.

they were not personally harmed. Id. at 105. See also Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (1965).
154. 412 U.S. 669, 670 (1973).
155. Id. at 673 n.2 (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7)).
While the case does not discuss this explicitly, it is worth noting that
the Act also has a clause stating that the ICC may conduct a hearing
for “parties aggrieved.” 49 U.S.C. §1(2); see also Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (holding that an African-American
passenger on a train who was denied seating met the conditions for
“aggrieved party” under the Interstate Commerce Act and had standing
to bring suit against the ICC).
156. In line with previous decisions, the Court acknowledged that noneconomic injuries such as environmental or aesthetic concerns are also
“deserving of the legal protection through the judicial process.” 412 U.S.
at 686.
157. Id. at 685.
158. Id. at 687.
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D.

Prudential Limitations and Third-Party Standing

The second aspect of standing that is considered in addition to
the Article III requirements is that the plaintiff must overcome any
judicially-imposed prudential factors, which are “presumptions
derived from common-law tradition designed to determine whether a
legal right exists.”159 The most commonly invoked prudential concern
with administrative agencies is the general prohibition on third-party
standing, where a third party asserts a claim on behalf of another
injured party.160 This limitation is derived from two policy rationales.
First, adjudicating third-party rights may be unnecessary,161 and it
may even be the case that the injured parties do not want their rights
asserted.162 Second, “third parties themselves usually will be the best
proponents of their own rights.”163 Because courts depend on “effective
advocacy,” they should “construe legal rights only when the most
effective advocates of those rights are before them.”164 However, in
some cases, third-party standing is allowed in light of “countervailing
considerations.”165 There are two such overriding elements that the
courts have considered when granting third-party standing. First, the
interests of the third-party litigant and the injured party he
159. Scalia, supra note 69, at 886.
160. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (holding that a litigant can
generally not raise another person’s legal rights); see also Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 500 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff generally must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. . . . Without such
limitations . . . essentially matters of judicial self-governance—the courts
would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be more
competent to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”).
161. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1140 (D. Colo. 2012)
(stating the prudential standing principle that federal courts should
“refrain from resolving abstract questions of wide public significance”);
see also FCC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (holding that where a
large number of people are suffering together, “the political process,
rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate
remedy for a widely shared grievance”).
162. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976); see also The Wilderness
Soc’y v. Cane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011) (reiterating
the Singleton holding).
163. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
164. Id.
165. The Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1172; Warth, 422 U.S. at 500–01
(stating that countervailing considerations “may outweigh the concerns
underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power when the
plaintiff’s claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties”).
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represents must be “inextricably bound,” and the two must have a
close relationship.166 For example, in Singleton v. Wulff, the Supreme
Court granted standing to two physicians who brought an action on
behalf of their patients challenging the constitutionality of a Missouri
statute that excluded certain abortions from Medicaid benefits.167
While recognizing the general ban on third-party standing, the Court
considered the relationship between the doctor and patient and found
that “[i]f the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the
activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least can be sure
that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that
the right’s enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the
suit.”168 Because the physicians would receive payment for the
excluded abortions if the statute were overturned, they would “enjoy”
the right the patients would receive if the statute were deemed
unconstitutional. Essentially, this exception maintains third-party
standing because both the third-party and the injured party have an
interest in the suit, ensuring that there is a proper “case” or
“controversy” per Article III.169
The second countervailing consideration is that even if there is a
close relationship between the litigant and third party, “‘some genuine
obstacle’ to the third party asserting his own rights must exist.”170
This exception was expounded in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the
Supreme Court held that a doctor had standing to assert claims on
behalf of his third-party patients in challenging the constitutionality
of a statute that prohibited medical professionals from giving advice
to married couples that would prevent conception.171 In addition to
finding that a close relationship existed between the doctor and
patient, the Court also recognized that the rights of married couples
at issue here were “likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless
those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this
kind of confidential relation to them.”172 Thus, if injured parties face

166. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–15; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188–89
(1973).
167. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–15.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 113–14.
170. The Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1172 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at
116).
171. 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
172. Id. at 481; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–15; see also Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 36 (1915) (holding an employee had standing to assert rights of
his employer); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (holding that a
white defendant, as a party to a racially-restrictive covenant, had
standing to raise rights of African-American purchasers claiming a
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obstacles that could be overcome through third-party litigation, then
the representative parties are accorded standing.
Eisenstadt v. Baird is a similar case illustrating the two
countervailing considerations. The petitioner in that case was a
distributor of contraceptives who challenged the constitutionality of a
statute that denied unmarried persons access to contraceptives. He
was granted standing on behalf of those whose rights were restrained
under the statute, even though his rights were not personally
restricted under it (i.e., he was able to obtain contraceptives himself),
and he was not an authorized distributor under the statute. Even
though he lacked the close personal relationship with the injured
parties as in Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the relationship
between the plaintiff and those whose rights he sought to assert was
“not simply that between a distributor and potential distributees, but
that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain
contraceptives and those desirous of doing so.”173 Further, the injured
parties in this case, unmarried couples, were not subject to
prosecution because they could not obtain contraceptives in the first
place (unlike the married couples in Griswold); thus, they were
effectively denied a forum to defend their rights, in which case thirdparty standing was more appropriate.174 In certain cases, then, thirdparty standing can escape prudential limitations, and in fact even be
encouraged.
Even though there are exceptional circumstances when thirdparty standing is allowed, where the legislature determines that a
legal right exists through statutory language, the “prudential inquiry
is displaced.”175 Moreover, as long as Congress has created a right of
action, litigants can “seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and
interest of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest
in support of their claim.”176 Thus, an explicit private right of action
would preempt any prudential concerns a court may raise in denying
standing. Standing could then be granted, provided that Article III
requirements were also met.177
violation of equal protection, even though no African-Americans were
party to the suit).
173. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1972); see also Robert Allen
Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme
Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 631 (1962).
174. 405 U.S. at 445–46; see also Barrows, 346 U.S. at 249.
175. Scalia, supra note 69, at 886; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)
(“Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”).
176. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
177. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 71 (“[T]he Court may interpret statutes
authorizing any citizen to sue to expand standing to the maximum
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In addition, a private right of action can circumvent other
prudential concerns, such as any political considerations that may
arise. In Allen v. Wright, plaintiff-parents did not have standing to
prevent the government from violating the law in granting tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory schools.178 One of the reasons
the Court decided against standing was that the parents’ injury was
not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly wrongful conduct of the IRS.179
This conclusion is supported by the idea that separation of powers
“underlies standing doctrine.”180 If standing were granted in this case,
then the federal courts would effectively be “monitors of the wisdom
and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the
Congress acting through its committees and the ‘power of the purse’;
it is not the role of the judiciary.”181 Therefore, if Congress wants to
carve out a role for the judiciary in such actions, it could do so by
creating an express right of action in the relevant statutes. Such a
solution would provide injured parties or third-party litigants the
necessary means of litigation without triggering prudential, separation
of powers, and other political concerns.

IV. Victim Participation in the International Criminal
Court
The second major analog to a right of public participation comes
from international law: the idea of public participation is not just
rooted in public interest litigation in U.S. law; it also has a place in
international law at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
Rome Statute creating the ICC is unique in that it contains a victim
participation clause to allow victims of crimes tried in the ICC to be
able to participate in the proceedings.182 The clause creates a
statutory right for victims to “be able to appear before the court and
express their views in all stages of the proceedings.”183 It is important
to note that while the extent of the ICC’s victim participation in
allowed by Article III. In other words, Congress in expressly permitting
such citizen suits is seen as abrogating prudential requirements and
allowing standing so long as it is constitutionally permissible.”).
178. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
179. Id. at 753.
180. Id. at 759–60.
181. Id. at 759–60 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
182. Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the
Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS 409, 409 (2008).
183. ICC, Victims and Witnesses, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Structure+of+the+Court/Victims/; Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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judicial proceedings is novel, the concept of victim participation in
criminal proceedings is not—a few other countries, such as Spain,
provide victims with the right to participate in criminal proceedings
as a prosecutor with full prosecutorial rights.184 Other jurisdictions
accord similar rights where they allow victims to act as “subsidiary
prosecutors” who can submit evidence; provide input on questions to
be asked of the witnesses and defendant; and comment on statements
and evidence submitted in the proceedings. In the U.S., Canada,
Israel, New Zealand, Ireland, and parts of Australia, victims can
partake in criminal proceedings by submitting victim impact
statements or opinions.185 Thus, the ICC is the first to promulgate
such extensive victim participation in international judicial
proceedings; however, the basis for such a system—the belief that
victims have a fundamental right of involvement in criminal
proceedings that directly affect them—has long been recognized in
several countries.186
The international community recognized the important role that a
victim could play in ICC proceedings, both within and outside the
courtroom, as a “witness” or a “participant.” Victims are allowed to,
among other things: (1) attend and participate in hearings before the
Court; (2) make statements during the opening and closing
statements; (3) provide observations to judges while the ICC is
deciding whether to proceed with an investigation; (4) present their
views to the judges when the ICC is deciding what charges to bring
against the accused; and (5) ask questions to a witness, expert, or
accused appearing in the Court.187
In addition, they may also participate without appearing in court
and may send information to the ICC Prosecutor to provide him with
details or evidence of crimes the victim believes have been
committed.188 In this way, the ICC allows victims of crimes against
184. Carsten Stahn, et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings
of the ICC, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 219, 223 (2005). There has actually
been a growing trend in the international community starting in the
1960s to amend government policies to address victim compensation.
See Mina Rauschenbach & Damien Scalia, Victims and International
Criminal Justice: A Vexed Question?, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS
441, 442 (2008).
185. Stahn, supra note 184, at 223.
186. See Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for
Participation, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 294, 295–97 (describing schemes for
victim participation in England and Ireland).
187. ICC, VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GUIDE
FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT
13, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C029F900-C52946DB-9080-60D92B25F9D2/282477/160910VPRSBookletEnglish3.pdf.
188. Id. at 9.
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humanity to seek some form of legal redress and reparations that
would not be available in their home countries. Further, allowing
victims to report information about crimes is a valuable asset when
gathering evidence and can assist the ICC by providing information
that the Prosecutor might otherwise not be able to obtain.
Victims are also always entitled to a legal representative who can
present their interests to the ICC. The Victims and Witness Unit
even assists in finding legal counsel and helps with arranging the
representation.189 Thus, the victim participation scheme is devised so
that victims have both a forum and representation to make their
claims.
The policy rationales for the ICC Statute’s victim participation
clause are manifold. First, the inclusion of such a clause has an
important symbolic value—the extensive recognition that victims
must have access to justice and a right to be made whole, especially
because many do not have such avenues within their own countries.190
A U.N. General Assembly Resolution, The Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,
reiterates the importance of this access to justice, demonstrating that
victims’ rights speak to a value that must be upheld in the
international community.191 Second, the incorporation of victims’
perspectives serves an equitable function as well; it helps to keep the
proceedings balanced. Victims’ interests often diverge from those of
the Prosecutor or the states involved, and consideration for victims
ensures that the process remains fair and objective.192 Further, the
recognition of victims’ rights has two additional far-reaching effects.
The first is a practical one: by including and factoring in first-hand
accounts and knowledge of the commission of the relevant crimes,
thus the victims provide evidentiary value. Victims are in the best
position to describe actual events, and this knowledge may be crucial
to the Prosecutor when deciding whether to initiate an investigation.
189. Id. at 10.
190. See WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF
LAW, VICTIM PARTICIPATION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 8–9 (2007) (explaining how traditional norms of retributive
justice are shifting to incorporate elements of restorative justice); Emily
Haslam, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A
Triumph of Hope over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 315 (Dominic McGoldrick
et al. eds., 2004).
191. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶¶ 1(b), 11(a), 12–14, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005); see also Stahn, supra note 184, at 226.
192. Stahn, supra note 184, at 227; but see Baumgartner, supra note 182, at
415–16 (questioning whether the potential advantages of trying to
counter-balance the Prosecutor can actually be met).
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The second is that victims’ suffering is made known to the
international community, which has a significant moral and symbolic
effect by providing reconciliation to the aggrieved persons and
nations.193
Even though the victim participation clause speaks to ideals and
values the international community is trying to preserve, there are
several logistical and practical problems with the implementation of
this idea. A broad and sweeping interpretation of victims’ rights could
interfere with two bedrock principles of the ICC: the basic functioning
of the Court as a judicial institution, and the necessity of
impartiality.194 The ICC (or any court, for that matter) is designed
primarily as a judicial institution; it is not equipped to serve as a
public forum or claims commission for thousands of victims, each with
their own accounts and situations. By allowing the potential influx of
victims’ into ICC proceedings, the clause imposes heavy
administrative burdens on the inner workings of the Court, and
effectively delays or halts the Court’s proceedings.195 Moreover, court
proceedings are predicated on fairness and expediency, which are
basic elements of due process. Victim participation can cause delays,
which may prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial.196 Even
more problematic is that the inclusion of victims in the early stages of
the proceeding contradicts the presumption of innocence—the Court
may begin to consider (and lean toward) the victims’ position without
the input from the defense.197 Additionally, there is a concern that

193. Stahn, supra note 184, at 227; see also U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL
AND CRIME PREVENTION, HANDBOOK ON JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS ON THE
USE AND APPLICATION OF THE DECLARATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME AND ABUSE OF POWER 39 (1999).
194. See Baumgartner, supra note 182, at 415.
195. Stahn, supra note 184, at 229; see also Christine H. Chung, Victims’
Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of
the Court Clouding the Promise?, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS 459,
489 (2008).
196. See Chung, supra note 195, at 489–91 (arguing that undue delay was
precisely the defense’s concern in the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a
DRC militia leader).
197. See Claude Jorda & Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the
Victim, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1399 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002)
(warning that there is already a delicate balance between the roles of a
prosecutor and defendant, and that the interjection of a third player as
the victim may disrupt this balance, causing prejudice to the
defendant); Stahn, supra note 184, at 227; Chung, supra note 195, at
490.
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despite the Rome Statute’s best intentions, there has been little
“meaningful” victim participation in practice.198
Notwithstanding these concerns and criticisms, the victim
participation clause remains part of the Rome Statute, signifying its
importance to the international community. There may be logistical
and administrative problems, but the basic notion of victim
participation is still upheld.199

V. The Alien Tort Statute
Perhaps the earliest attempt in U.S. history to recognize the
rights of foreigners in U.S. courts is shown through the Alien Tort
Clause, the predecessor to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The Alien
Tort Clause was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and it allowed
district courts to have jurisdiction over cases where an alien sued only
for a violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty.200 The Clause
was included to ensure that tort claims based on violations of the law
of nations were “cognizable” in federal courts.201 The root of the ATS’
power lies in the Diversity Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which
provides the extension of judicial power to cases and controversies
between a “State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or subjects.”202 Through this clause, the ATS allows a foreign plaintiff
to sue American citizens.203 The primary rationale at the time was
national security—Alexander Hamilton expressed in the Federalist
Papers that the denial of justice abroad was a real concern for the
U.S. federal judiciary because violations of rights abroad could lead to
retaliation against the U.S.204 By providing for an impartial process
through the federal judiciary, the ATS could serve as a judicial

198. See Chung, supra note 195, at 509–14 (citing examples of how only a
handful of hundreds of victims’ applications to participate were
accepted, among other issues).
199. See Baumgartner, supra note 182, at 440 (arguing that the ICC needs
reform and stricter, more defined guidelines, but victim compensation
and participation is still a worthy cause); Rauschenbach & Scalia, supra
note 184, at 459 (same); Chung, supra note 195, at 525–36 (proposing
several solutions to improve the victim participation scheme, rather
than dispense with it altogether).
200. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 587, 587 (2002).
201. Anthony D’Amato, The Alien Tort Statue and the Founding of the
Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 64–65 (1988).
202. U.S. CONST. art. III.
203. D’Amato, supra note 201, at 65.
204. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
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solution to a potential political problem.205 While these same security
concerns may not exist presently, the U.S. still has an interest in
upholding foreigners’ rights because the U.S. must preserve the
perception that it will deal fairly and impartially with cases having
global implications.206 The origins of the ATS are significant because
it shows that since its inception, the U.S. has had a policy of
recognizing the rights of foreigners, and that such rights are
fundamental in that they stem from the Constitution. The ATS
evidences at least some U.S. commitment to rights of foreign citizens.
The existence of the ATS has mostly had symbolic value as very
few cases were brought under this Act—in fact, the statute “lay
dormant”207 for nearly 200 years until the landmark Filártiga v. PeñaIrala case was heard in the Second Circuit in 1980.208 That Court held
for an expansive reading of the ATS, which provided federal
jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of nations, even if those
torts were not recognized in 1789.209 Specifically, the Court held that
torture was a tort recognized under the Act because it violates the
law of nations.210 Because the statute’s language only calls for a
“violation” of the law of nations to be actionable, any current
violation of international law would suffice to create a cause of action
in federal court.211 The Court further held that the ATS was intended
to be dynamic so that it could provide a federal remedy for all torts in
violation of the law of nations.212
However, this extensive interpretation of the ATS was
controversial at the time, and has continued to cause conflict among
scholars regarding the ATS’ proper interpretation.213 In a decision
205. D’Amato, supra note 201, at 65–66 (describing Hamilton’s concern that
state courts were biased against aliens, and only a federal court could
impartially adjudicate cases involving foreigners).
206. Id. at 67.
207. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What
Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 111, 112 (2005).
208. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
209. Id. at 881.
210. Id. at 882.
211. William S. Dodge, Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the “Originalists”, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221,
222 (1995).
212. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887–88; see also Note, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: A
New Forum for Violations of International Human Rights, 30 AM. U. L.
REV. 807, 821–22 (1981).
213. See Farooq Hassan, Note, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filártiga
Jurisprudence, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 250, 257 (1983) (cautioning, for
example, that usage of the ATS may prompt more hostile nations to
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following and applying Filártiga, Judge Robert Bork wrote in a
concurring opinion that the Filártiga court construed the ATS too
broadly, which ultimately led to a contrasting school of thought for
“originalists.” He believed that many modern human rights cases
could not be brought in federal courts and were not justiciable
because the law of nations does not provide an express cause of
action, which is generally required in order for claims to be heard in
U.S. courts.214 Further, Judge Bork argued that only the original torts
(offenses against ambassadors, safe passage, and piracy),215 which
reflected the law of nations in 1789, provided the requisite cause of
action.216 Thus, because modern torts in violation of the law of nations
do not grant an express cause of action, federal courts cannot have
jurisdiction under the ATS for these claims. The details and nuances
of the differences in the positions between the originalists and those
that side with the Filártiga majority are beyond the scope of this
Note; however, what is significant is the interpretative spread between
the two sides. The ATS has remained limited in application, and
where it has been applied, courts and scholars are in wide
disagreement.217
In addition to the disagreement over the latitude of the ATS,
there are other restrictions with the ATS’ application. Generally, the
legal suits have fallen into one of two categories. First, there are
claims by foreigners against foreigners, which has been a controversial
use of the ATS. For these types of cases, courts suggest that only
crimes that “bear resemblance to eighteenth century paradigms” like
piracy should be allowed in federal courts.218 The second type of case
is when foreign citizens have sued foreign and American corporations
assert similar jurisdiction over international law claims against foreign
visitors, leading to “chaotic or unjust results”); Jeffrey M. Blum &
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,
22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 88–89 (1981) (devising a three-part test to
determine which rights should be actionable under the ATS, thereby
limiting the application of the ATS).
214. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798–823 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
215. Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 113.
216. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798–823.
217. It is worth noting that Congress did pass the Torture Victim Protection
Act in 1992, following Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren.
Congress specifically included an express cause of action making torture
an actionable crime in U.S. federal courts. Due to the egregious and
universal nature of torture, Congress wanted to unambiguously carve
out an actionable right for certain crimes. See Dodge, supra note 211, at
238.
218. See Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 113.
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for violating international human rights and environmental standards
in their business practices abroad, or for facilitating such violations of
foreign governments.219 Choosing defendants like corporations may
have been a strategic choice, as plaintiffs would be more likely to
recover damages while also avoiding sovereign immunity challenges,
but Filártiga’s scope could have allowed for more cases of foreigners
against corrupt governments.220
In the most recent application of the ATS, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain221 that the ATS is a
jurisdictional statute, where the only exceptions are the original
Blackstone common law offenses.222 Essentially, the ATS only provides
jurisdiction over those historical paradigms envisioned by the First
Congress. Unlike the Filártiga court, the Supreme Court held that it
is not sufficient for the modern tort to be recognized by modern
customary international law; “rather, it must violate customary
international law in a way that connects it to the concerns manifest in
the eighteenth century offense describe by Blackstone and
contemplated by Congress.”223 The Court established a two-prong test
to determine whether a modern international norm comes within the
scope of the ATS: (1) the international norm must be near universal
in its acceptance, and (2) the conduct it prohibits must be defined
with considerable specificity.224 Thus, despite the ATS’ and Congress’
best intentions, its application remains limited and controversial.
Several types of cases, such as those by foreigners against U.S.
agencies, or those involving modern torts, have not—and perhaps
cannot—be raised under the ATS. For these foreign plaintiffs, there is
still no method of recourse in U.S. federal courts.
The examination of the ATS is crucial in that it shows the statute
is limited in scope, controversial, and ill-equipped to deal with the
unique challenges that USAID funding raises to the issue of human
rights violations. Thus, the confined nature of the ATS supports the
fact that there is no current mechanism in place to deal with the
types of complaints and grievances felt by victims of misappropriated
USAID funds. Further, Judge Bork’s assertion that an express cause
of action is needed to bring modern violations of international law to
219. Id. at 117.
220. Id. (“Given the widespread use of torture, murder, and political
repression by the governments of the world, the ATS cases represented
but a small fraction of what could have been brought under Filártiga’s
broad construction of the statute.”).
221. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
222. Id. at 694.
223. Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 121; 542 U.S. at 716.
224. Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 121; 542 U.S. at 725.
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U.S. courts—confirmed through Congress’ subsequent passage of the
Torture Victim Protection Act225—shows that to avoid ambiguity, an
express cause of action is required and needed to ensure certain
violations are actionable in U.S. federal courts.

VI. The Federal Tort Claims Act
At first glance, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)226 seems like
another possible route for private parties to bring a suit against the
U.S. in federal district court. The types of actions included under the
FTCA are for damage to property, personal injury, or death caused
by wrongful acts or omissions of government employees, or those
acting on behalf of the U.S., while acting within the scope of their
office or employment.227 The FTCA provides a limited exception to
sovereign immunity, which generally forecloses a suit from being
brought against a country’s government without its consent.228 Given
its narrow scope, the FTCA does not cover agency actions—it only
addresses actions taken by specific individuals acting within the
course of their employment with the government.229 Thus, the FTCA
is also unavailable as a method of recourse for foreign victims.

VII. Application of Public and Victim Participation
Doctrine to USAID
A.

Absence of Redress for Victims of Misappropriated USAID Funding

By examining the various types of statutes and cases that have
somehow involved public victim participation in court or government
proceedings, the primary concern is clear: there are no current means
of legal recourse or redress for victims of misappropriated USAID
funds. However, while this established body of law highlights the
problems and inadequacies of the U.S. system in dealing with these
types of victims, they also illuminate the path to a solution. First,
they show that the notion of public participation is deeply rooted in
U.S. history, and is also practiced internationally. Second, while they
all support the idea of victim participation, none of the current cases
or statutes would support a claim made by a victim of misused
USAID funds. USAID has no internal mechanism for grievances or
225. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2011).
227. Kevin E. Lunday, Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1254, 1255 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
228. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (4th ed. 2011); see also Thomas A.
Varlan, Defining the Government’s Duty under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 33 VAND. L. REV. 795, 800 (1980).
229. Varlan, supra note 228, at 796.
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judicial review, and the types of human rights violations do not fit
into the usual paradigm of tort cases that have been filed in U.S.
federal courts per the ATS or FTCA.230 For example, while U.S. aid
money has helped to fund these violations, the crimes themselves were
committed by governments or individuals within the foreign
countries;231 therefore, a traditional criminal liability or negligence
analysis would not necessarily implicate USAID or deter such
violations in the future. Further, as USAID is a large agency with
multiple actors, donors, and political considerations, it would be
difficult to prove the necessary elements of a typical tort violation,
including the responsible party and causation. Thus, an alternative
solution is needed to fill this void.
The APA has so far not been used as a cause of action to
challenge USAID agency action. As previously discussed, the APA
provides a cause of action where an agency’s governing statute either
uses terms such as “aggrieved” or “adversely affected,” or at least
seeks to protect certain rights.232 In the latter case, the statute has to
aim to prevent a particular harm—if a claim arises that that harm
has occurred, the APA may provide a cause of action in that case
because it falls with the “zone of interests” of the statute.233 The
FAA, however, does not contain such language—there is no explicit
reference to “aggrieved” or anything similar,234 and it does not
actively seek to prevent any specific harm or injury.235 Some may
argue that using the APA is a better method of challenging USAID
agency action, as it is a pre-existing mechanism and would require
230. See supra notes 200–29 and accompanying text.
231. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 40–41; VIETNAM REPORT, supra note
4, at 26, 30–40.
232. See supra notes 139–58 and accompanying text.
233. See id.
234. If a term like “adverse” is used, it is in reference to specific projects, not
people affected by them. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub.
L. No. 87-195, § 232(b), 75 Stat. 424 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151
(1961)) (referring to adverse environmental impacts); id. § 237
(regarding insurance and financing programs, and possible adverse
effects on investment).
235. The FAA does have a section addressing human rights, stating that no
funds should be allocated to governments with a history of documented
human rights violations. In determining whether this standard is being
met, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations may require proof from
the USAID Administrator and terminate assistance if necessary. See id.
§ 116. However, while this safeguard is in place, it does not appear that
the FAA actively seeks to protect the rights of victims; it is more that
USAID does not wish to aid in the violation of their rights. Thus, the
appropriate statutory language does not exist for a claim to be brought
via the APA.
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fewer changes to the FAA. Several other agencies’ statutes already
contain references to an “aggrieved party” or something similar,236 and
thus an amendment to the FAA along these lines could model its
language based on these. Nonetheless, this Note argues for a more
extensive amendment to the FAA through an express private right of
action, as this solution avoids ambiguity, addresses prudential
concerns, and has a better chance of actually vindicating the interest
of victims. The large corpus of public rights cases in U.S. federal
courts, as well as the existence of other types of victim participation
statutes, can also serve as a guide for statutory amendments to the
FAA.
B.

Regulatory Agencies as a Model for USAID

While the case law focused on regulatory agencies, not agencies
like USAID, they indicated a progression of liberalized standing
requirements, ultimately allowing claims against federal agencies from
more parties and for new types of injuries. Congress should now
reform non-regulatory agencies like USAID in a similar manner as a
continuation of this expansive trend. The impetus for this growth was
to help federal agencies realize their statutory purpose to serve the
public; thus, by incorporating more claims, the courts aid in
vindicating that public interest. Because of USAID’s unique function,
it aims to serve a “public” that resides beyond U.S. borders.237 Indeed,
USAID’s stated goal, as reiterated in many provisions of the FAA, is
to assist developing countries achieve sustainable development,
through, inter alia, monitoring, reporting, and commitments against
corruption and human rights violations.238 Thus the notion of “public
interest” should expand to those adversely affected by USAID actions,
even though they do not live in the U.S.; with that expansion, the
federal courts should assume a role to vindicate their interests as
well.239
236. Compare Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825/(b), and Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6), with Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (allowing “any person disclosing a substantial
interest in such order” to obtain review), Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. §1(2) (providing for the Interstate Commerce Commission to
investigate claims from “parties aggrieved”), National Labor Relations
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (preventing labor disputes that would “adversely
affect” the rights of the public; Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §
80(a)-42(a) (claiming to eliminate conditions that “adversely affect” the
national public interest”); see also Note, supra note 101, at 430; Albert,
supra note 88, at 429 n.12.
237. See Foreign Assistance Act § 101.
238. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
239. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“We must assess claims
that one of the agencies charged with its administration has failed to
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The cases discussed in Part III serve several functions and are
instructional for amending the FAA and USAID. The case law reveals
that an express right of action accomplishes four things: it (1)
overrides prudential concerns of third-party standing,240 (2) avoids any
political questions that may otherwise arise,241 (3) silences issues of
governmental immunity, and (4) eases the granting of standing.242 In
order to provide victims of USAID funding with a legal remedy, the
FAA should thus contain an express private right of action allowing
these victims to challenge USAID agency action. As previously
mentioned, this right must specify the persons able to bring suit;
those who are potentially liable; forum for a suit; and possible
remedies available.243
The persons able to bring suit should be those who have been
directly harmed by misappropriated USAID funds, as well as thirdparty groups who have an interest in the litigation and are in a better
position to bring suit on behalf of actual victims. The primary
concern is that while a cause of action nominally creates an avenue
for victims, it is unlikely that victims of USAID funding in
inaccessible rural areas of a developing country will have access to the
U.S. judicial system. Therefore, the FAA amendment should allow
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or other groups or
corporations to raise a claim on behalf of the victims. United Church
provides the most useful precedent and guidance in this matter.244 In
that case, the plaintiffs were groups deemed as representatives of the
public interest.245 Similarly, human rights groups or other types of
NGOs, through their very mission and function, serve to represent the
rights and interests of those citizens in countries where human rights
violations are occurring.246 The United Church court also applied a

live up to the congressional mandate. Our duty, in short, is to see that
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”).
240. See supra notes 159–77 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.
243. Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. CV 09-08950, 2010 WL 1444878, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010), aff’d 722 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
244. See Note, supra note 101, at 425, 433 (maintaining that the public right
of intervention adopted in United Church will likely be extended to
other agencies).
245. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1001 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
246. See,
e.g.,
Mission
Statement,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/about (asserting that they are “dedicated to
protecting human rights of people around the world” and committed to
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broader view of “genuine and legitimate interest” for the purposes of
standing, which should also cover such NGOs—as part of their
mission to raise awareness and prevent human rights abuses, they
have a genuine and legitimate interest in litigating such claims.
Further, United Church recognized that such groups representing
the public interest helped the FCC perform its statutory obligations
by informing them of the public’s concerns. Human rights NGOs can
play a similar role—by raising claims of abuses, they not only
vindicate the victims’ interests, but they simultaneously inform
USAID of the problems occurring in the various countries. With
USAID’s structural problems and reduced staffing, it is not aware of
the conditions in the countries once the funding is disbursed. NGOs
can serve as a fact-finder and can apprise USAID of these problems,
helping both victims and USAID in fulfilling its purpose. HRW, which
conducted the two inquiries in Ethiopia and Vietnam, acknowledged
the relative inaccessibility of the areas where the violations were
occurring. In fact, it was difficult even for them to talk to people
affected by the funding or find those who were willing to share their
concerns.247 If an independent organization has difficulty gaining
access, then it is unreasonable to expect a large agency like USAID to
access or be aware of the conditions in each of the targeted developing
areas. Regardless, an NGO like HRW has a better chance of
discovering the true conditions in developing nations and of serving as
a fact-finding organization that can report on the implementation and
effects of USAID funds on the actual citizens of aid countries.248 In
these cases, NGOs would be akin to Commissions of Inquiry that have
been used in the U.N. as fact-finding tools.249 Using NGOs and their

investigating and exposing human rights violations and holding abusers
accountable).
247. VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 26, 30–40; ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra
note 3, at 44–45.
248. With regard to prudential standing concerns, it is possible that NGOs
would be granted standing on behalf of such victims even without a
private right of action. In line with Griswold and Eisenstadt, this
situation contains countervailing considerations. NGOs like HRW have
a relationship with victims tantamount to doctors and patients because
victims share confidential information with them. See ETHIOPIA
REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, 43. Further, given the obstacles these
victims would face accessing U.S. courts, third-party standing seems
both appropriate and preferred. In any case, a private right of action is
still the most direct way to ensure access and standing.
249. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Commissions of Inquiry into Armed Conflict,
Breaches of the Laws of War, and Human Rights Abuses: Process,
Standards, and Lessons Learned, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 81, 82 (2011).

671

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2014
Foreign Assistance at Home: Increasing USAID Accountability

accounts from victims is also supported by the policy rationales
behind the victim participation clause in the ICC.250
Because of this difficulty in accessibility, it is unlikely that
USAID would be overburdened by complaints—HRW itself had
trouble gaining access and information about victims,251 so it is even
more unlikely that victims themselves will be inundating courts with
claims. In any case, USAID could follow the FCC’s approach, and
implement internal policy guidelines through which it can impose
conditions and retain some level of control over which parties can
raise claims.252
Potentially liable parties should include those who could most
effectively implement change, such as the USAID Administrator and
the regional mission director overseeing a particular country or area
(though they would not personally have to pay damages). The forum
would be federal district court; as the FAA is a federal statute, a
private right of action therein would give these courts original
jurisdiction. Lastly, the remedies should include the possibility of
monetary compensation provided by USAID for damages incurred to
victims, as well as an order for increased monitoring by mission
directors. While wholesale rescission of funding may be ultimately
desirable, the political implications of such an action could jeopardize
the U.S.’ diplomatic, military, or economic efforts in the country at
issue. In any case, it is likely beyond the unilateral power of Congress
or the courts to interfere with foreign policy on that level without
participation of the President and the Executive Office.253
C.

Future Concerns and Long-Term Changes

Even if the FAA is amended to create a right of action for
victims, it will face several challenges in implementation—in addition
to actually getting NGOs or victims access to federal courts, there are
a number of other jurisdictional, venue, remedy and damages issues
that require further exploration.
As discussed previously, creating a cause of action is a short-term
solution to bring current human rights violations to light, and to
provide some recourse for foreign victims who are adversely affected
by USAID funds. However, the true reform must occur within
USAID’s organization and structure itself. While a statutory right of
action deals with the problem, structural reform will prevent the
250. See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text.
251. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, 43.
252. See supra notes 138–38 and accompanying text.
253. The U.S. President has authority in several matters of foreign affairs.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing, among other things, that the
President can enter into treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate and appoint ambassadors).
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problem from occurring in the first place. Once USAID autonomy is
restored, its agenda and budget will be controlled primarily by those
devoted to providing aid to developing nations. This in turn will
require that development be mainstreamed along with security and
diplomacy as part of U.S. foreign policy. If development is recognized
as a key component to U.S. foreign policy, USAID will be able to
achieve more of its goals and provide the necessary staffing and
attention to its projects abroad.

VIII. Conclusion
The U.S. has long played a role in the growth and development of
developing nations through millions of dollars of funding for various
projects. While the U.S. is still a leader in the development cause, a
number of internal structural problems has led to mismanagement of
the USAID funds in their target countries. These misappropriated
funds have been used by foreign governments to withhold basic
freedoms from their citizens, as well as violate their fundamental
human rights. The ultimate solution lies in preventative measures,
where USAID works to fix its internal problems through a complete
overhaul of its mandate in the FAA—a solution that will likely take
several years, due especially to the current state of the U.S. economy
and its budget restraints.
In order to immediately address the needs of victims, a limited
amendment to the FAA is a more adequate solution. Such an
amendment would create an express cause of action where victims
could challenge USAID agency actions—namely, the funding provided
for certain projects being used to commit human rights violations.
This type of amendment would provide some remedies for the victims
where they are unable to receive any in their home countries. Further,
it would serve as a mechanism to report the actual conditions in these
developing countries. Part of the problem is that USAID (with its
reduced field presence) remains unaware of conditions after funding is
distributed. With the help of NGOs and statutory recourse, victims
would be able to achieve some relief, as well as serve as fact-finders to
ultimately help USAID address the many human rights violations
that are taking place.
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